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Cavers: "Questions of Law" in Lake Cargo Coal Rate Regulation

"QUESTIONS OF LAW" IN LAKE CARGO COAL RATE
REGULATION
DAVID

F. CAVERS*

On February 15, 1911, shippers of lake cargo coal in the
Pittsburgh district filed a complaint with the Interstate Commerce
Commission alleging that the rate on their shipments was "excessive and unreasonable in and of itself" and that it had "been
fixed by agreement among the railroads so as to discriminate
against the Pittsburgh field in favor of the West Virginia fields".
On May 8, 1931, the Interstate Commerce Commission was advised by its examiner to dismiss complaints brought by lake cargo
coal shippers in the Pittsburgh and Ohio districts alleging that
the current rates thereon, established by agreement among the defendant carriers serving the complainant and the West Virginia
and Kentucky fields,' were unduly prejudicial to complainants and
preferential to West Virginia and Kentucky coal interests.
Assistant Professor of Law, West Virginia University.
"Lake cargo coal" is coal moved by rail to lower Lake Erie ports (Ashtabula, Cleveland, Conneaut, Erie, Fairport, Huron, Lorain, Sandusky, and
Toledo), there dumped into the holds of vessels and transshipped as cargo
to Great Lakes ports, Lake Superior and Lake Michigan ports receiving 70%
of the shipments.
2Boilen v. P. & L. E. R. R., 22 I. C. C. 640 (1912). Contemporaneously,
the Commission suspended for investigation increases in rates from West
Virginia fields. In re Advances in Rates on Coal, 22 I. C. C. 604 (1912).
8In 1927 the Interstate Commerce Commission had ordered the reduction in
rates on coal from Pennsylvania and Ohio fields, establishing thereby a
rate differential in favor of the Pittsburgh district of 45 cents a ton over the
Kanawha, Kenova and Thacker districts of West Virginia and the Big Sandy,
Kentucky, Hazard, MeRoberts, Harlan, and South Jellico districts of Kentucky, and a differential of 60 cents over the New River, Tug River and
Pocahontas districts of West Virginia, the Clinch Valley and Stonega districts of Virginia, and the Oakdale district of Tennessee. The differential
of 3 cents enjoyed by Ohio districts over Pittsburgh was untouched. Lake
Cargo Coal Rates, 1925, 126 I. C. C. 309 (1927). A rate reduction of 20
eents by the southern carriers restoring thereby the differentials of 25 and
40 cents, which had been in force ten years, was cancelled by the Commission in Lake Cargo Coal, 139 I. C. C. 367 (1928). This order was enjoined by the statutory court in Anchor Coal Co. v. United States, 25 F. (2d)
462 (S.D. W. Va. 1928). Before an appeal was heard, the carriers serving
both fields agreed in the summer of 1928 on compromise differentials of 35
and 50 cents a ton. The Supreme Court held that this compromise rendered
the controversy moot and reversed the decision below with directions to dismiss the bill. United States v. Anchor Coal Co., 279 U. S. 812 (1928). The
present complaints are brought against the rates established pursuant to this
compromise. Complaint is also made of the 20 cent differential which- the
Fairmont field in northern West Virginia is granted over Pittsburgh. -This
differential, after having been increased from 15 to 25 cents by the reductions
in northern rates ordered in 1927, was reduced to 20 cents by agreement in
1929.
'Ohio Lake Cargo Coal Rate Committee v. B. & 0. R. R., Docket No. 23240;
1
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Twenty years and more have thus elapsed between the opening
gun and the latest finding in this economic war which has been
waged before the Interstate Commerce Commission and the courts.
During that time the prize at stake, the lake cargo coal traffic,
has grown to tremendous proportions.' During the same period
the bituminous coal industry has fallen on evil days, and the competitive struggle for markets has been correspondingly sharpened. These factors have accentuated the intensity of feeling which
has marked this litigation. These same factors demonstrate, moreover, that it is not only the fortunes of the embattled operators
which are at stake, for to their fortunes is inextricably linked the
economic welfare of two populous regions in which coal is king.'

I
It may at some future time be considered a curious commentary on the present stage of our economic and political
ontogeny that interests of such magnitude should be dependent
on the issue of a law suit. Yet, interesting as are the tendencies
in our governmental development which have engendered this
situation, their investigation would call for a penetration into that
substratum of political and social belief the relevance and importance of which the lawyer persistently chooses to ignore.' The
Western Penna. Coal Traffic Bureau v. B. & 0. R. R., Docket No. 23241.
The examiner's opinion appears in full in U. S. Daily, May 9, 1931, at 585.
"The total tonnage of lake cargo coal shipped from all district has increased over a period of twenty years as follows:
1923
1925
1927
1929
1909
1911
1913
1921
(In millions of tons)
15.3
21.6
26.8
22.3
29.8
26.3
32.8
37.9
Of this tonnage a percentage which has increased from about 10% in 1923
to approximately 20% in 1929 consists of low volatile coal, produced chiefly
in the New River, Pocahontas, Tug River, Clinch Valley, Stonega and Oakdale districts. This coal, because of its special quality, is less competitive and
therefore is not so directly affected by rate adjustments.
OAlthough lake cargo coal amounts to little more than 10% of the total
coal mined in the fields engaging in this traffic, nevertheless its economic
importance is greatly disproportionate to its volume. This coal is mined
and shipped in the months from April to November when the demand for
coal is lowest. It affords to many operators, therefore, a means of keeping
their mines in operation throughout the year. The significance of this to
miners and mining communities as well as operators, is self-evident. Moreover, in an industry so depressed as the bituminous coal industry, margins of
profit, if any, are low, and the shift in a relatively small volume of business
may spell failure to the operators losing it.
7Considerations of this nature are to be distinguished from argument based
on the immediate economic consequences of the Commission's decision. These,
of course, are duly emphasized in briefs of counsel in the current Lake Cargo
Coal Case. Moreover, a brief has been filed by a group of large consumers
of lake cargo coal in the Northwest, urging the Commission to consider the
public interest in the continuance of the southern fields in the competitive
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legal technique, devised for the adjudication of the conflicting
claims of A, landlord, against B, his tenant, of C, purchaser,
against D, vendor, lends itself effectively to this endeavor to
insulate the questions formulated for decision from the grave
problems of social policy which do in fact underlie them. The
congruities (which might be imperilled were counsel for the X
Coal Company to advise court or commission on fundamentals of
national social policy) are thereby preserved. The lawyer can
evade the ultimates because in lieu of reasons he can proffer decisions, or more frequently the formulae into which decisions, after
they have passed current for a time, tend to degenerate. If perforce he must go behind these, it will be to the decisions or formulae
from which they in turn were drawn.
Obviously this methodology does not exclude considerations of
social policy from the actual determination of cases of this nature.
Some room for play must be left in the articulation even of the
most rigidly systematized branches of private law. This freedom
grows progressively greater as the transition is made into the
domain of public law. In the field of commerce regulation where
statutes for the most part are no more than letters patent issued
to the courts and commissions by legislatures of lawyers charging
them with the duty of law-making,8 this opportunity for the introduction of the non-legalistic determinant is at its widest. Some
observers conclude, therefore, that such factors alone are operative;
that the lawyer, aside from his work of fact-gathering, ministers
only to the maintenance of a mystery whereby the uninitiate are
shielded from the truth that administrative and judicial tribunals
are, within their ever-widening jurisdiction, determining as they
see fit the economic destinies of the nation.
If this were the whole truth, then it would be barren labor
to study a problem of the nature of the Lake Cargo Coal Case
in its legalistic aspects. But this view, in its denial of any intermarket. The "public", as is customary, is identified with these consumers
whose object is, of course, to secure the lowest possible coal prices.
OThe Supreme Court has charged itself with the preservation of the doctrine of separation of powers deemed implicit in the Constitution. Nevertheless, it has shown a marked tendency to relax the doctrine forbidding the
delegation of legislative powers. The pretence of preserving the doctrine is
maintained by the requirement that Congress establish legislative standards
to govern administrative bodies in the exercise of their rule-making and regulatory powers. See Note (1914) 28 HAnv. L. Rxv. 95. The essentially formal
nature of this requirement becomes most patent in the delegations of power
to the Interstate Commerce Commission where the standards, I"reasonable'",
"1just", "undue", etc., have no content other than that given by their application to the facts of successive cases. They are, in substance, directions to
legislate wisely.
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action of the legalistic factors with the socio-economic, ignores
one of the realities of the situation. In their insistence that we
have in truth a government of men and not of laws, its proponents
forget that those men are lawyers, that the lawyer is legalistic in
his mental processes, that he is disciplined to defer inquiry and
judgment where judgment, if not inquiry, has been made before
him, that his reluctance to assert an uncontrolled discretion is as
real as the considerable, if unavowed, indulgence therein is inevitable. To one who must employ the legal technique, no question is res integra in its broadest implications. It must always
fall within a zone of uncertainty demarcated by two or more
judicially determined points. And however adroit the skilled
advocate or judge may be in shaping his argument or opinion to
evade the unfavorable implications of such predetermined positions, the very fact that he must and does take them into consideration vouches for their significance.
Precisely how great
that significance may be is a question not susceptible of determination for its answer depends not only on the facts of the case and
the nature of the problem but also on the intellectual processes
of the persons who decide it. In any event, on the threshold of
an inquiry into the legalistic aspects of the current Lake Carge
Coal Case, it is enough to know that the formulation of the legal
problem, however much it may serve to conceal the vital issues
that underlie it, will, nevertheless, be of some importance in their
determination.
II
Except in 1917 the Interstate Commerce Commission has
heretofore? addressed itself to the problem of whether the lake
cargo coal rates under attack violated the injunction of Section 1
(5) of the Interstate Commerce Act that "all charges made for
°Lake cargo coal rates have been subjected to Commission scrutiny in the
following cases: Boileau v. P. & L. E. R. R., supra n.2; In re Advance in
Rates on Coal, supra n. 2; Clyde Coal Co. v.P.R. R., 23 I. C. C. 135 (1912)T
Boileu v. P. & L. E. R. R., 24 I. C. C. 129 (1912); New Pittsburgh Coal
Co. v. H. V. Ry., 24 I. C. C. 244 (1912); Pittsburgh Vein Operators of Ohio
v. Penna. Co., 24 I. C. C. 280 (1912); San Toy Coal Co. v. A. C. & Y. Ry.,
34 I. C. C. 93 (1915); Lake Cargo Coal Rates, 46 I. C. C. 159 (1917); Lake
Cargo Coal Rates, 1925, 101 I. C. C. 513 (1925); Lake Cargo Coal Rates,
1925, 126 I. C. C. 309 (1927); Lake Cargo Coal, 139 I. C. C. 367 (1928).
In the 1917 case, although the allegation of discrimination was abandoned
by tho complainants during the course of the proceedings (46 1.C. C. 159,
163), the Commission nevertheless undertook a general investigation of the
lake cargo coal rate structure and, in establishing differentials to be observed thereafter, expressly found the existing differential unduly preferential
and prejudicial (46 I. C. C. 159, 189).
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any service rendered or to be rendered in the transportation of
passengers or property . . . shall be just and reasonable."'
No
question of its power to act in the premises could be raised in such
proceedings. Since 1906 the Commission has enjoyed, under Seetion 15 (1), the power to "determine and prescribe what will be
the just and reasonable rate ... to be thereafter observed in such
case as the maximum to be charged"." And in 1920 it was granted
by the Transportation Act amendment to the above section the
further power to designate the maximum or minimum or maximum
and minimum rates to be charged" The reasonableness of a rate, we have been repeatedly informed by both the Commission and the courts, is a "question of
fact"." It happens, however, that reasonable men tend to differ as to this "fact" of reasonableness; in the lake cargo coal
cases the opinions of reasonable men seem with marked uniformity
to have depended on whether, between the 79th and 85th parallels
of longitude their interests lay north or south of the line established successively by Messrs. Mason and Dixon and the Ohio
River. In other words, it is a "fact" which does not preexist the
To term the
determination of those appointed to decide it.
reasonableness of a rate a question of fact is merely to epitomize
the proposition that what a rate shall be rests in the discretion of
the "fact-finding" body. The evidentiary facts presented for its
consideration do not speak for themselves, and for a commentator
to call in question a Commission decision as to the reasonableness of
a rate establishes only his belief in the superiority of his own
judgment over that of the Commission. The lawyer has therefore
primarily the task of persuasion, of influencing the judgment of
the Commissioners in accordance with his desires.
Where, however, he fails in that task, he has another string
to his bow. Questions of fact, so runs the formula, are for the
Commission; questions of law, for the courts. To secure the review of an unfavorable exercise of the Commission's power, the
The provision
1041 STAT. 474 (1920), 49 U. S. C. A. § 1 (5) (1926).
quoted dates, in substance, from the Act of 1887. 24 STAT. 379 (1887).
"Section 15, as originally enacted, 24 STAT. 384 (1887), was held not to
empower the Commission to fix maximum rates. I. C. C. v. Cincinnati, N. 0.
& T. P. Ry., 167 U. S. 479 (1897). The Hepburn Act added the provision
quoted above. 34 STAT. 589 (1906).
" 41 STAT. 484 (1920), 49 U. S. C. A. § 15(1) (1926).
1Illinois Central R. R. v. I. C. C., 206 V. S. 441 (1907). See cases collected in 1 INTERSTATE Comm. AcTs ANN. 326. (This valuable digest "prepared by and under the direction of" Commissioner Clyde B. Aitehison in
response to Senate Resolution No. 17, Dec. 6, 1927, was published in 1930 by
the U. S. Government Printing Office.)
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lawyer must show that that body erred in the determination of
some question of law. Since, in the lake cargo coal rate proceedings brought under Section 1, the Commission's jurisdiction to
act has been undisputed, counsel have been faced with the difficult task of bringing to light errors of law in the exercise of that
jurisdiction. The courts have steadfastly repeated their refusal
to look behind determinations of fact by the Commission provided
more than a scintilla of evidence could be found to sustain them.
But they have been equally steadfast in their assertion of power to
review errors of law,1' and the significance of this refusal becomes
evident when one recalls that there is no inherent distinction between questions of fact and of law.'
A question of law is a
question of fact writ large---'a ground of difference between court
and fact-finding body which can be isolated and expressed as a
general proposition applicable beyond the particular case to all
similar cases"." To effect the transmutation calls merely for a
certain verbal dexterity, and counsel in seeking the review of Commission decisions have been adept in alchemy of this sort."
Yet it was not until 1928 that the Lake Cargo Coal Cases
"In I. .C. v. Union Pac. R. R., 222 U. S. 541, 547 (1912), Mr. Justice
Lamar, while disclaiming an intent to be exhaustive, summarized the situations
in which Commission orders might be set aside as follows: " . . . . the
orders of the Commission are final unless (1) beyond the power which it
could constitutionally exercise; or (2) beyond its statutory power; or (3)
based upon a mistake of law. But questions of fact may be involved in the
determination of questions of law so that an order, regular on its face, may
be set asi~de if it appears that (4) the rate is so low as to be confiscatory
....
; or (5) if the Commission acted so arbitrarily and unjustly as to fix
rates contrary to evidence, or without evidence to support it; or (6) if the
authority involved has been exercised in such an unreasonable manner as
to cause it to be within .the elementary rule that the substance, and not the
shadow, determines the validity of the exercise of the power."
0 This dichotomy has been a convenient tool to which the courts have recourse at several points in the judicial process. See GRFnN, JUDGE AND JURy
(1930) 268. Its significance can be appreciated only in relation to the
specific functions for which it is employed. See Thayer, "Law and Fact" in
Jury Trials (1890) 4 HkAv. L. REv. 147; Cook, Statements of Fact in Code
Pleading (1921) 21 CoL. L. Rv. 416. Its employment in the review of administrative decisions is discussed in DICxInsoN, A.DINISTRATIVE JUSTIcE
AND THE

SUPREmAoY or LAw (1927) 50-55, 151-153, 167-170, 313-319.

"ADioxINsoN, op. ct. supra n. 15, at 168.
1'In St. Louis & O'Fallon By. v. U. S., 279 U. S. 461, 492 (1929), Mr.
Justice Brandeis, in his dissent, lists instances in which the Supreme Court
has set aside the Commission orders on the ground of erronebus consideration
of evidence: "Orders have been set aside because entered without evidence;
or because matters of fact had been considered which were not in the record;
or because the Commission excluded from consideration facts and circumstances which ought to have been considered; or because it took into consideration facts which could not legally influence its judgment."
He argues that
the O'Fallon decision constituted an invasion of the Commission's previously
recognized power to determine "to what extent, if any, weight should be
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yielded an example: the statutory court in the Anclwr Coal Co.
case ' enjoined the enforcement of the order of the Commission forbidding the reductions in rates proposed by the southern carriers
which were designed to restore differentials enlarged by the previous reduction in the northern rates ordered by the commission
in the 1927 proceedings. One of the grounds of decision was that
"the Commission exceeded its powers, in that its action was based,
in part, at least, upon industrial conditions, and was essentially an
effort to equalize industrial conditions or offset economic advantages through adjustments of rates".? It would not be profitable here to subject this decision to critical scrutiny.? It constitutes, however, a graphic illustration of the technique whereby
the seemingly plenary powers of the Commission over this question of fact may be controlled by the courts.
In the current Lake Cargo Coal Case the challenge of the
complainants does not go to the reasonableness of the rates. The
complainants instead assert that they are in violation of Section
3 (1) of the Interstate Commerce Act which declares unlawful the
giving by a carrier of "any undue or unreasonable preference or
advantage to any particular person . . . or locality . . . in any
or
respect whatsoever, or to subject any particular person . .
given to the evidence" (p. 494).
Considering only the last two situations in the enumeration quoted, one is
struck with the freedom thus reserved by the Court to restrict Commission
action.
Supra n. 3.
1025 F. (2d) at 471.
0 The decisions of the Commission and the court have been commented on
in a previous volume of the LAW QUARTERLY. See Arnold, The Lake Cargo
Bate Case of February 1928 (1928) 34 W. VA. L. Q. 272; Note, ibid. 404.
The so-called doctrine of relative reasonableness the scope of which the
Anchor Coal Co. case seems to limit is discussed at length in an excellent
note entitled "Consideration and Control of Commercial Conditions in Railroad Rate Regulation", (1931) 40 YALE L. T. 600. See also Mansfield, The
Hoch-S inth BesoZution and the Consideration of Commercial Conditions in
Rate-Fixing (1931) 16 CORN. L. Q. 339; Robinson, The Hoch-Smith Resolution
and the Future of the Intdrstate Commerce Commission (1929) 42 HARV.
L. Rsv. 610, 623.
With reference to the analogous process of controlling the discretion of
fr aasonableness, Professor Thayer observed 1 ..
a jury on questlon
the subject of more specific legal
-tO
such questions become, from tneime
rule or definition . . . . But where that has tR .Ahap
'
is eIther
pened is a change in the legal rules; the rule of "reasonableness"
displaced or narrowed. When once the exacter rule is known, what is left is
Thayer, op. oit. supra n. 15, at 170.
none the less a mere question of fact."
This equanimity is comprehensible when the only question at issue is the redistribution of functions between judge and jury. But the significance of
the process is heightened when its result is not the mere narrowing of a legal
rule but the transfer of power from Commissioners "informed by experience"
to judges informed by counsel.
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locality . .. to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever.' ' Here, again we encounter a
The existence of a "preference", "adquestion of "fact".'
may be subject to
vantage", "prejudice" or "disadvantage"
objective demonstration, but the Act denounces only the "undue"
and the "unreasonable". The insertion of these adjectives operates as a grant of discretionary power to the Commission, and, for
the reasons adverted to above with respect to determinations of
reasonableness, it would be supererogatory to inquire into the wisdom of its exercise in this or, indeed, any similar case. But inquiry is pertinent as to the means available for its control. To
fetter the exercise of this discretion, if it be within the jurisdiction of the Commission, counsel must, in the present case as in the
past, discover some "ground of difference" which may be magnified into "a general proposition applicable beyond the particular
case". A question which may prove susceptible of such enlargement can already be discerned in the current proceedings, "' but
whether it will ever emerge as an issue to be carried to the courts
depends first on the determination of a much more significant
question of law-the jurisdiction of the Commission to apply Section 3 (1) to the lake cargo coal rate structure.
It is this question which renders the legal element in the
present case of unusual interest, for the power of the Commission
to act in the premises is vigorously contested. It has in fact been
expressly disclaimed by the majority of the Commission in the
1925' and 1927" and, by implication, in the 1928' proceedings
before it. Yet, curiously, in 1917, the Commission exercised this
disputed power without discussion and, apparently, without evoking any protest.0 In recent years, however, Section 3 has been the
- 41 STAT. 479 (1920), 49 U. S. C. A. § 3(1) (1929).
2See Texas & Pac. Ry. v. I. C. C., 162 U. S. 197, 219 (1896); I. C. C.
v. Ala. Mdland Ry., 168 U. S. 144, 147 (1897).
24See p. 418, infra.

25See Lake Cargo Coal Rates, 1925, 101 I. C. C. at 545.
See Lake Cargo Coal Rates, 1925, 126 I. C. C. at 364.
2See Lake Cargo Coal, 139 I. C. C. at 390, 392.
2 See n. 9, supra. In Lake Cargo Coal Rates, 1925, 126 1. U. C. at 364,
the Commission said: "It is true th, -- dae prejudice and preference were
found in the Lake ('at7n o--z case of 1917, but it does not appear that the
q.u=aon nere raised was considered in that case; and, moreover, the finding
there applied to the differential over the Ohio No. 8, Cambridge, and Hocking
districts, which all take the same rates, but the last mentioned district is
served by the Hocking Valley, so the situation was different". The Hocking
Valley Ry., then an independent, is now controlled by the C. & 0. Ry.
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object of considerable judicial scrutiny.' Doubtless these decisions,
coupled with the repeated assertions of Commissioner Eastman
that the Commission has power to act under Section 3 ,' have determined the change in strategy of complainants' counsel. In
view of the pendency of the case before the Commission, a consideration of the merits of this problem of statutory interpretation
would be of dubious propriety, but there is room for an inquiry
into precisely what are the questions which may now or in some
future litigation under Section 3 arise for determination.
III
The nub of the contention that the Interstate Commerce Commission lacks power to charge the defendant carriers with a violation of Section 3 lies in the fact that the same carriers do not
participate in both the allegedly preferential and prejudicial
rates. A glance at the various fields and the routes serving them
will illustrate the difficulty. One of the complainants is the
Western Pennsylvania Coal Traffic Bureau. It represents operators in the Pittsburgh, Butler-Mercer, Freeport, and Connellsville
producing districts located in south-western Pennsylvania. These
fields are served, either directly or under through routing arrangements, by the Pennsylvania, New York Central, Baltimore & Ohio,
Erie, Bessemer & Lake Erie, Montour, Pittsburgh & Lake Erie,
Pittsburgh & West Virginia and Wheeling & Lake Erie Railroads.
The other complainant, the Ohio Lake Cargo Coal Conunittee is
an association of coal operators in producing districts in eastern
and southern Ohio. The eastern Ohio districts are served by the
Pennsylvania, N. Y. Central, B. & 0., Erie, P. & W. Va., and the
W. and L. E. Railroads. The southern Ohio districts are served
by the Pennsylvania, N. Y. Central, B. & 0., and the Chesapeake
and Ohio Railroads. The carriers are, of course, the parties defendant, but the operators in southern West Virginia, Kentucky,
Virginia and Tennessee have joined forces to intervene in the proceedings.'
Lake cargo coal shipments are originated in these
St. Louis S. W. Ry. v. United States, 245 U. S. 136 (1917); Central R.
R. Co. of N. J. v. United States, 257 U. S. 247 (1921); United States v.
Illinois Central R. R., 263 U. S. 515 (1924); Chicago, I. & L. Ry. v. United
States, 270 U. S. 287 (1926); Virginian By. v. United States, 272 U. S.
658 (1926).
coSee Lake Cargo Coal Rates, 1925, 126 L C. C. at 371; Lake Cargo Coal,
139 I. C. C. at 400.
31The Fairmont Coal Traffic Bureau, an association of operators in the
Fairmont district, has also intervened to protest against any increase in the
existing Fairmont differential of 20 cents over Pittsburgh. Since the Fairmont field is served by carriers which also serve the northern fields, its
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fields by the following railroads: Norfolk & Western, Chesapeake
& Ohio, Louisville & Nashville, Virginian, and the Southern. A
substantial proportion of these shipments reach the lake at Toledo
over the rails of the C. & 0. The N. Y. Central also originates
and delivers some southern coal. The balance reaches the lake
over through routes established by the above lines with the
Pennsylvania, B. & 0., and N. Y. Central.
This complex network of carriers resolves itself for the purpose of this case into four groupings: (1) the northern independents, i. e., those roads serving only northern fields which, incidentally, have not been joined as parties defendant, (2) the
northern participants, i. e., the Pennsylvania, Baltimore & Ohio
and New York Central, which serve directly or join in through
routes from both the northern and southern fields, (3) the
southern participants, i. e., the Norfolk & Western, Virginian,
Louisville & Nashville, and the Southern which join in through
routes from the southern fields; and (4) the Chesapeake & Ohio
which alone of the southern carriers maintains a direct route to
the lake, although it is also a participant in certain through routes
with the carriers in the second group.
If there were but a single system of railroads in the United
States, that system would be obliged to treat all similarly situated
and competing localities with substantial equality. But can there
be discrimination in a situation where the X R. R. charges a
higher rate from point A to point C than the Y R. R. demands
for an approximately similar haul from B to C? Looked at from
the standpoint of the shipper, the effect is the same whether one
or two roads perform the service. If the purpose of the statutory
prohibition is to insure equality of treatment to competing localities, then it becomes immaterial whether either of the carriers can
justly be charged with responsibility for its violation; the only
problem is whether power is vested in the Commission to correct
it. But if unjustly discriminatory rates are to be considered,
under Section 3, as a breach of duty on the part of the carrier,
then the question of responsibility becomes of the essence, and in
the hypothetical case, neither carrier could be held liable.
Prior to the Transportation Act the question, as to rates at
least, was not susceptible of conclusive determination. Unless
an order could be directed against a single carrier or group of
carriers directing the removal of the discrimination, the Commission was powerless to correct it, for where the situation prejudicial
to the complainant arose out of the acts of independent carriers,
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it would be necessary to establish minimum as well as maximum
rates in order to insure the preservation of such differential as
might be indicated to effect an equalization. But the Commission
did not obtain power to prescribe even maximum rates until the
adoption of the Hepburn Act in 1906," and the minimum rate
power was not obtained until the enactment of the Transportation Act in 1920.' Thus even had Section 3 been given the former
of the two possible constructions, the power to effectuate its purpose would have been wanting.'
The Commission was keenly aware of this limitation upon
its ability to correct rate inequalities. Several opinions contain
expressions indicating a belief that the grant of the minimum rate
power would remove the only obstacle to action." In several of
its Annual Reports in which the Commission urged this extension
of its authority, a similar attitude seems implied.' Commissioner
situation does not present the problems of law discussed hereafter which are
raised by any attempt to apply Section 3 to rates on coal shipments from
southern West Virginia districts.
234 STAT. 589 (1906).
0341 STAT. 484 (1920), 49 U. S.C. A. § 15 (1) (1926).
"With respect to alleged discriminations in the granting and refusal of
services, the Commission was given the same remedial powers it now exercises
by the Hepburn Act amendment to § 15 of the Interstate Commerce Act.
34 STAT. 589 (1906). The Commission may "determine and prescribe ....
what regulation or practice .... is just, fair, and reasonable to be there-

after followed". The decision in Penn Refining Co. v. West. N. Y. & P.
R. R., 208 U. S.208 (1908), holding that the defendant carrier which joined
in a through rate with another carrier alleged to be rendering preferential
service was not itself guilty of discrimination in refusing to render such
service, lends considerable support to the view that lack of responsibility on
the part of the carrier and not lack of power on the part of the Commission
was the basis for denying reparation to the complaining shipper.
'One of these dates from 1897. In Savannah Bureau v. Charleston & S.
Ry., 7 I. C. C. 458, 475, 476 (1897), the Commission observed, with reference
to a charge of discrimination: "Each line is an independent line and may
fix its own rate wherever it pleases, and we have no power whatever over
that rate when established. It is manifest that a wrong like that complained
of in this case could not be corrected without authority to establish both the
maximum" and the minimum rate. And we can establish neither." It added
that this same limitation of power rendered it helpless to correct a situation
where the defendent carrier participated in both rates but made the allegedly
preferential rate in response to an independent carrier's competition. This
view is repeated in Roberts Cotton Oil Co. v. I. C. R. R., 21 I. C. C. 248,
251 (1911) where the following statement appears: "If we were authorized
to fix a minimum rate, or to treat the carriers collectively as a single unit or
system, the adjustment complained of is one which might call for correction".
The statement is repeated verbatim in Memphis Freight Bureau v. B. & 0. R.
R., 28 I. C. C. 543, 547 (1913). See also Boileau v. P. & L. E. R. R., 24
I. C. C. 129, 133 (1912).
"This first extended discussion is to be found in the Seventh Annual Report of the Commission. See 1893 ANN. REP. I. C. C. 38. A vigorous argument that the minimum rate power be granted to correct discriminatory
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Clark appearing before the Committee on Interstate Commerce of
the United States Senate in 1919 submitted a memorandum collating a number of such expressions.' Yet the Transportation Act
which added the minimum rate power by amendment to Section 15
(1) of the Interstate Commerce Act made no alteration of substance
in Section 3 (1) prohibiting unlawful preferences or prejudices,
and in the reports and debates on the former in the course of its
passage, its relationship to the latter was not made evident.'
In Central R. R. Co. of N. J. v. United States,' the contention
was made that participation by a carrier in a joint rate obliged
it to render to shippers on its lines the same privileges accorded to
shippers by the connecting lines. The court, relying on a decision
differentials maintained by independent lines was embodied in the Eleventh
Report. See 1897 ibid. 23-26. See also 1894 ibid. 26; 1901 ibid. 82.
See CLARK, INTERSTATE COMMERCE (1919) 214.
In his speech of Dec. 4, 1919, explaining the provisions of the bill containing this amendment, Senator Cummins of Iowa, Chairman of the Senate
Committee on Interstate Commerce, said merely: "As it is now, the Commission is not given express power to prescribe minimum rates. The commission has the power to prescribe the rate at which an article shall be moved, in order to enforce the law against discrimination, but there is no
authority for a schedule of minimum rates. This bill adds to the present law
the power on the part of the commission to prescribe such rates as well as
maximum rates. This is particularly important with reference to the division
of rates as between connecting carriers whether they be land carriers or
whether one of them be a land carrier and the other a water carrier". 59
CONG. REC. 141 (1919). Representative Esch, presenting the bill to the House
on Nov. 11, 1919, made a very similar and equally brief statement. 58 ibid.
8317 (1919).
The Committee reports are little more enlightening. In H.
R. RiP. No. 456, 66th Cong. 1st Sess., submitted with the House bill, the
following statement is made at p. 19 concerning the grant of the minimum
rate power: "With this power the commission could prevent a rail carrier
from reducing a rate out of proportion to the cost of service, by establishing
a minimum below which such carrier could not fix its rate. It would also
prevent a rail carrier from destroying water competition between competitive
points by prohibiting such carrier from so reducing its rates as to destroy
its water competitor . . . . The power to fix minimum rates will also enable
the commission to adjust many cases under the fourth section of the Commerce act, known as the "long and short haul clause". The Senate Report
contained no reference to this amendment. SEN. REP. No. 304, 66th Cong. 1st
Sess. The conference report repeated in substance the above statement.
H. R. REP., 66th Cong. 2d Sess., at 65.
A lively debate arose in both House and Senate with respect to the long
and short haul clause which led to its amendment. 41 STAT. 480 (1920), 49
U. S. C. A. § 4 (1) (1926). However, the analogous problem of discrimination under Section 3 does not seem to have been adverted to. The senators
and representatives from the mountain states sought to withdraw the Commission's discretionary power to permit exceptions to the rule forbidding a
greater charge for a long than for a short haul. See 58 CONG. REQ. 85838592 (1919); 59 ibid. 641-660 (1919), 3344-3348 (1920).
The effect of
competition by the water carrier remained in the forefront of the discussion,
to the exclusion of a thorough consideration of the problem in all its aspects.
89Supra n. 29.
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antedating the Transportation Act, held that this participation
in the joint rate did not render the defendant's refusal discriminatory since it did not participate in the grant of the privilege
alleged to be preferential. Moreover, Mr. Justice Brandeis, speaking for a unanimous court, made the following significant observation with reference to Section 3:
"What Congress sought to prevent by that section, as
originally enacted, was not differences between localities
in transportation rates, facilities and privileges, but
unjust discrimination between them by the same carrier or
carriers. Neither the Transportation Act 1920, February 28,
1920, c. 91, 41 Stat. 456, nor any earlier amendatory legislation has changed, in this respect, the purpose or scope of §
3'a
If the views of the Supreme Court have changed since this
enunciation of the doctrine that discrimination in rates may be
effected only by the same carrier or carriers, then the Lake Cargo
Coal Case may afford to it an opportunity to repudiate its earlier
position." But until such an alteration of opinion is made evident,
it remains necessary to examine the implications of the principle
embodied in the passage quoted above.
10 Penn Refining Co. v. West N. Y. & P. R. R., supra n. 34.
"257 U. S. at 260. The Commission in ordering the removal of the alleged
discrimination had argued that the requirement of participation had been removed by the enlargement of the Commission's powers under the Transportation Act. American Creosoting Co. v. Director General, 61 I. C. C. 145 (1921).
Accord, Southern Hardwood Traffic Assn. v. Director General, 61 I. 0. 0.
132 (1921).
The belief that the Transportation Act in granting to the Commission
power to prescribe maximum and/or minimum rates whenever it "shall be
of the opinion that any individual or joint rate . . . . is or will be ....
unjustly discriminatory or unduly preferential or prejudicial", 41 STAT. 484
(1920), 49 U. S. C. A. § 15 (1) (1926), has enlarged the Commission's
control over alleged discriminations by independent carriers, retains considerable vitality despite the Central R. R. Co. case. In Jefferson Island
Salt Mining Co. v. United States, 6 F. (2d) 315 (N. D. Ohio 1925), a three
judge court held valid a Commission order setting minimum rates for the
transportation of salt in the face of the argument that this was an improper.
exercise of the Commission's powers under Section 3 since the defendant
carriers were independent. The Commission had found that a rate war
impended and that the rates on salt tended to place an undue burden on other
items of traffic. Salt Cases of 1923, 92 I. C. C. 388, 410 (1924).
The
court invoked Section 15 (1) and also Section 15a (2), 41 STAT. 488 (1920),
49 U. S. C. A. § 15a (2) (1926), which empowers the Commission to establish
rates so that the carriers as a whole will earn a fair return on their aggregate
value. On p. 318, the court stated: "In the present case, the evidence is
ample that ruinous rate wars can only be avoided and a reasonable relationship between rates collected and service rendered can only be maintained by
the power exercised by the Commission. If plaintiff's contention were sustained, it would cut the heart out of the 1920 amendments to the Interstate
Commerce Act. The new objects and purposes to be accmplished ....
would
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IV
We start then with the assumption that the X R. R. cannot
be guilty of discrimination in fixing a rate between A and C,
however glaring may be the discrepancy between this rate and
that charged by the Y R. R. between B and C. Suppose, however,
that the Y R. R. reaches C from B only over the rails of the X R.
R. and that there is a joint rate for the through route. In such
a situation may the X R. R. be held subject to a Section 3 order ?
Since it controls both rates there is no doubt but that it may."
There is open to it the alternative of reducing the higher rate or
increasing the lower. If the offending rate is the joint rate, the
X R. R. may withdraw therefrom if it cannot put an end to the
discrimination otherwise. But is this control over the rates essential to liability under Section 3'? If it be, then may the Y R.
R., which can effect only one of the two rates whose relation gives
rise to the complaint, be subjected to a Commission order?
Until recently the requirement of control over both rates
seemed firmly established. Its basis, however, was uncertain.
There is some evidence that it was deemed to arise out of the
limitations on rate-making power of the Commission. Indeed, it
was held in an early decision that the Commission's orders under
Section 3 must afford the carrier the alternatives of abandoning
the preference, abolishing the prejudice, or establishing some new
basis of equality." Obviously this could be done only where one
carrier was responsible for both the preference and the prejudice.
The Commission has, on occasion, sought to adjust rate discriminabe nullified. New section 15a would be read out of the act." Apparently
it is only where rates are noncompensatory or rate wars are threatened that
Section 15a becomes pertinent. Perhaps this fact will serve as the basis
for reconciling this decision with the Central R. R. Co. case, which was not
mentioned by the Court. On the other hand, it may point to a trend away
fiom that decision. Certainly it goes farther than the Illinois Central case,
supra n. 29, discussed infra p. 412 on which the court relies. A later Commission.order prescribing minimum salt rates was rested on a finding of unreasonableness and not discrimination. Eastern Salt Cases, 122 I. C. C. 21, 36
(1927), injunction denied, sub nom. Akron, C. & Y. By. v. United States,
22 F. (2d) 199 (W. D. N. Y. 1927).
3United States v. Illinois Central R. R., supra n.29. Itisnot essential
that the defendant carrier reach the prejudiced or preferred community on
its own rails. St. Louis S. W. Ry.v. United States, supra n. 29; of. Chicago,
I. & L. Ry. v. United States, supra n. 29. An early lower federal court decision had held to the contrary, Allen & Lewis v. Ore. R. & Nav. Co., 98 Fed.
16 (C. C. D. Ore., 1899), and this view was at one time adopted by the
Commission.

See BEATE & WYMAN,

RAILROAD RATE REGULATION

(2d ed.

1915) § 773.
"Detroit, G. H. & M. Ry. v. I. C. C., 74 Fed. 803 (C. C. A. 6th, 1896).
This decision, of course, antedated even the maximum rate powers of the
Commi sion.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol37/iss4/4

14

Cavers: "Questions of Law" in Lake Cargo Coal Rate Regulation
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
tions by prescribing differentials," but this did not obviate the
necessity that the order be directed to a carrier able to put it into
6
effect by virtue of its control over both rates."
Yet in at least
one older case the Commission seems to have dealt with a discrimination by ordering a reduction in rates although a dissenting
Commissioner complained that there was no finding of unreasonableness.' 7 But such an order, though it need be directed to a
road controlling only the prejudicial rate would, of course, remain
effective only so long as the preferential rate remained unchanged."
As has been indicated above, this maladjustment of legal
machinery for combatting rate discriminations in situations involving more than one carrier persisted until the enactment of the
Transportation Act which by an amendment to Section 15 (1) of
the Interstate Commerce Act vested in the Commission the power
"to determine and prescribe what will be the just and reasonable
individual or joint rate, fare, or charge . . . to be thereafter observed... or the maximum or minimum, or maximum and minimum, to b charged" in cases where Commission is of the opinion
that the rate attacked "is or will be unjust or unreasonable or unjustly discriminatory or unduly preferential or prejudicial".'
But while this amendment augmented the remedial machinery at
the disposal of the Commission, it did not expressly purport to
broaden the definition of "unjustly discriminatory or unduly
preferential or prejudicial". If the basis of the requirement that
a carrier, to be subject to Section 3, must control both rates lay
In N. Y. C. & H. R. R. v. I. C. C., 168 Fed. 131 (C. C. S. D. N. Y.
1909), a Commission order establishing a relation of rates instead of a
maximum rate was upheld on the ground that it merely required the equalization of charges for similar services and did not prescribe how the charges
should be equalized. The court said, at p. 136 "It is not to the specific
power to prescribe maximum rates, but to the broad powers, applicable in
the case of violations of the act by unjust discriminations, conferred by
section 12 .... and, by section 15 .... that resort must be had". No
question of non-participation was in issue. See also R. R. Comm. of Tenn.
v. Ann Arbor R. R., 17 I. C. C. 418 (1910).
'8This limitation on the employment of differentials was recognized in
one of the early lake cargo coal cases. Boileau v. P. & L. E. R. R., 24 I.
C. C. 129, 133 (1912). Commissioner Meyer pointed out, moreover, that a
differential based on an absolute maximum rate from one district would
operate to" establish by indirection absolute minimum rates from the others.
"TIndiana Steel & Wire Co. v. C., R. I. & P. By., 16 1. C. C. 155 (1909),
Knapp, C., dissenting.
48In its Eleventh Annual Report, the Commission cites an instance in
which a subsequent rate reduction by a competing carrier frustrated the
Commission's attempt to put an end to a rate discrimination by ordering
a lower differential. 1897 ANN. REP. I. C. C. 24.
1041 STAT. 484 (1920), 49 U. S. C. A. § 15 (1) (1926).
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not in the limitations of the machinery of enforcement but rather
in the definition of the offense, then of course the amendment of
Section 15 (1) would not effect any substantive change.
The latter construction of Section 3 seems for a time to have
been adhered to by the Commission. That body in the much-cited
Asdand Fire Brick Co. caseu had already enunciated the proposition that "the test of discrimination is the ability of one of the
carriers ... to put an end to the discrimination by its own act"."
Although this doctrine had its origin, as will be seen,"' in a case
presenting substantially different considerations, the formula lent
itself to the question under discussion. If a carrier did not control both rates it could not put an end to the discrimination. If
it could not do that, how could it be held responsible for its maintenance? But if such control were a requisite of liability, under
what circumstances could it be said to exist? The difficulty of
answering this question with assurance injected one more element
of uncertainty into an already complicated problem.
A series of Supreme Court decisions seems at length to have
dissipated the requirement of control over both rates. It is unnecessary either that a carrier actually reach both the preferred
and the prejudiced points with its own rails or that it control the
rates to both.' Thus, in the hypothetical case which served to
pose this problem, it would seem that the Y R. R. could be held
responsible for a discrimination arising out of rates in fact fixed
by the X R. R. with which it formed a through route under a joint
rate from the preferred point alone. Discrimination is looked
upon as something in the nature of a tort. It is effected by the
disparity between the two rates and to one of these the Y 1R. R.
is a party. It is, therefore, a joint tortfeasor and will not be
heard to object that it is not in a position to correct the situation
by an alteration in its own rates."
m

Ashland Fire Brick Co. v. Southern Ry., 22 I. C. C. 115 (1911).

la bid. at 120.

uSee infra, p. 410.
4 St. Louis S. W. Ry. v. United States; United States v. Illinois Central
R. R.; Virginian Ry. v. United States, all supra n. 29.
In the Illinois Central case referred to above, two appeals were disposed of
in the single opinion. In the second of these, discussed in its final paragraph,
the only appellant was the short line which participated solely in the prejudiced
traffic and could not comply with the order by its own act, as could the
appellee Illinois Central in the first appeal. Yet a similar result was reached.
See the discussion of this case in Galveston Comm. Assn. v. Galveston, H.
& S. A. Ry., 160 I. C. C. 345, 358 (1929).
"This conception seems to underlie Mr. Justice- Brandeis' language in
Chicago, I. & L. Ry. v. United States, supra n. 29 at 293.
"'Unjust discrinination may exist in law as well as in fact, although the injury is in-
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If participation in rather than control over the discriminatory
rates is the criterion, may it be applied without any qualification as to its degree? Some limitations seem to have been established. Thus, mere participation in a joint rate will not be a basis
for liability where some practice of the connecting carrier rather
than the joint rate gives rise to the discrimination complained of.
The participation mupt be in the discriminatory act or practice. '
Yet the establishment of a through rate which is merely a combination of local rates and not a joint rate seems to suffice. And
where the participation in the preferential rate arises out of a
trackage agreement with the carrier establishing it, a finding of
discrimination will be sustained." On the other hand, when a
mere participation in a switching movement is the only connection
between the carrier granting the alleged preferential rate and
that demanding the prejudicial one, the Commission has refused
Iforeover, as recently as 1929, Commissionto find participation.'
er Eastman, who suffers from a chronic incapacity to be doctrinaire, made in the course of a dissent in a discrimination ease
in which all defendants actually participated in the rates at issue, the following comment:
" . . . there are court decisions which point to the conclusion that this fact affords a sufficient basis for the application of Section 3 ... On the other hand it may be argued
with force that it is our duty to looksto the substance rather
than to the form and to consider the extent to which defendants participate in what are in reality the rate-making
routes to and from the rival ports. In other words, the question is whether mere participation in rates to both is enough
if it is a participation which could be eliminated without
particular sacrifice and without nateirially changing the
situation.' '
In so far as the carriers serving the southern field participate
flicted by a railroad which has no such direct physical connection. Whereever discrimination is, in fact, practiced, an order to remove it may issue;
and the order may extend to every carrier who participates in inflicting the
injury . . . . Here each of the steam railroads was an effective instrument
Discrimination between persons by
of the discrimination complained of."
a carrier was held illegal at common law in some jurisdictions. This did not
op. cit.
extend to discrimination between localities. See BrAL & WYmA,
supra n. 43, §§ 619, 752.
1 Central R. R. Co. of N. J. v. United States, supra n. 29.
0United States v. Illinois Central R. B., supra n. 29.
wVirginian Ry. v. United States, supra n. 29.
EsJohn Magnus & Co. v. Pennsylvania R. R., 143 I. C. C. 363 (1928).
11Baltimore Chamber of Commerce v. Ann Arbor R. R., 159 I. C. C. 691,

708 (1929).
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in the alleged rate discrimination, their position is substantially
that of the Y R. R. in the hypothetical case. But even though
Commissioner Eastman's doubts be resolved in favor of requiring
that participation be material in order to subject a carrier to a
Section 3 order, is it likely that the southern roads can at present
avail themselves of this relaxation of the rule? The volume of lake
cargo coal shipped over through routes established by the N. & W.,
L. & N., Virginian, and even the C. & 0. in conjunction with the
northern carriers, the B. & 0., N. Y. Central and Pennsylvania,
may be found too considerable for them to obtain aid and comfort
from Commissioner Eastman's suggested invocation of de minimis.'
But that refusal to be satisfied by the showing of a technical
complicity in a discriminatory rate relationship which is implicit
in Commissioner Eastman's attitude may be of vital importance
to the southern interests. The contention that Section 3 is not
applicable to the lake cargo coal rate structure rests in the main
on the assumption that the C. & 0. R. R. is, or can become by
ceasing its present concurrences with northern roads, an independent carrier, free from any Commission control and capable
of serving the southern field exclusively by the means of its route
over the Hocking Valley lines to Toledo. Now this route also
serves the Hocking and Crooksville fields in southern Ohio, and
although these fields do not make important contributions to the
lake cargo tonnage,' they have been induced, possibly for reasons
of legal strategy, to join with the northern Ohio complainants.
The service which the C. & 0. affords them is direct access to the
lake over its own lines. It cannot, of course, withdraw from this
service. It is therefore clearly liable to a Section 3 order with
respect to this traffic, but this might be met by a reduction of
those rates only. Is it thereby rendered equally subject to a
charge of discrimination against all the northern fields? This
would destroy its claim of independence for the Toledo route and,
with that claim, the very foundation of the defendants' case.
Another aspect of this problem is considered infra, p.
01In the six-year period, 1924-1929, 141,869 tons were shipped from these
districts from mines on the Hocking Valley R. R. and 296,824 from mines on
the N. Y. Central R. R. In 1929 their total contribution to the lake cargo
coal traffic amounted to less than one half of one per cent. See Brief for
Defendants, Docket Nos. 23240, 23241, Vol. I, p. 53. Complainants allege that
prejudicial rates are responsible for the small volume of this traffic which
prior to 1924 was of substantial proportions. See Brief for Complainants,
Docket No. 23240, pp. 47-52.
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V
The theory on which that case is based centers on the proposition that no discrimination can be unduly prejudicial unless the
preferred shippers must necessarily employ the carriers against
whom the prejudiced shippers complain. An amplification of our
previous example will serve to illustrate this theory. Assume once
more that the X R. R. serves the A - C route and joins with the
Y R. R. in the B - C route. Transportation conditions are similar,
yet the A - C rate is higher than the B - C rate. If the Z R. R.
also runs from B to C and yet has no connection with either the
X or the Y R. R.s, then under the above doctrine, even though the
latter roads were to withdraw from their discriminatory joint
rate, still the discrimination in fact would persist by reason of the
lower rate on the Z route of which shippers at B could take advantage to the detriment of shippers at A.
This theory is derived from the Ashland Fire Brick Go. case!
decided in 1911. Commissioner Lane's statement of the doctrine
ran as follows:
"It is true that we have held in cases where joint or
proportional rates were made by all of the carriers leading to
certain points of destination that it was within our power
to end a discrimination as between points of origin by a reduction in the rate from a certain point that was discriminated against ... This principle, however, only has application where the traffic from both groups of origin is necessarily
transported to destination by the same connecting carrier or
carriers and where it is possible for the delivering carriers to
put an end to the discrimination by the exercise of their
power to refuse to enter into preferential joint or proportional
rates ... The test of the discrimination is the ability of one
of the carrier participating in the two through routes . . .
to put an end to the discrimination by its own act.' '
The statement must be read in the light of the facts of the
Asidand case. They are substantially those of the hypothetical
case. Substitute L. & N. for the X R. R., 0. & 0. for the Y R. R.,
and Mobile & Ohio for the Z R. R., Ashland, Ky., for A, St. Louis,
Mo., for B, and Birmingham, Ala., for C. The St. Louis rate on
fire brick was less than the Ashland rate for a longer haul yet,
as Commissioner Lane remarked, "this contrast arises out of the
desire of the Louisville & Nashville to compete with the other
carriers out of St. Louis, whereas it is not compelled to compete
12Supra n. 50.
e 22 I. C. C. at 120.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1931

19

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 4 [1931], Art. 4
LAKE CARGO COAL CASES
out of Lexington with either the Frisco or the Mobile & Ohio. It
manifestly would do Ashland no good whatsoever for the Louisville & Nashville to withdraw from the St. Louis business. '"
Once more it becomes necessary to press behind the formula
to the reasons for its employment' in order to determine whether
they still retain validity in the light of subsequent statutory
changes and the interpretation thereof by the Supreme Court.
The central question obviously is whether this is a rule which delimits the wrong or the remedy. Counsel for the defendant carriers stoutly maintain the former, and in their position have the
support of a decision of the Supreme Court in which Mr. Justice
White argues that the granting of a preferential rate to meet the
low rates of an independent competitor cannot, as a matter of law,
constitute "unjust discrimination".' The injury is caused by thd
lawful act of the competitor, not by the justifiable efforts of the
defendant to secure some shares of the business. Reference at this
juncture to the elusive "principles" of legal cause does not afford
much assistance. True, courts have not consistently required that

"
Ibid. at 121.
61In a consideration

of this question as a problem of legal doctrine, it is,
of course, important to inquire into its legal bases. That is not to assert,
however, that the legalistic explanation is the controlling one.
0 In East Tenn. etc. Ry. v. L C. C., 181 U. S. 1 (1901), an order of the
Commission granting relief under the "long and short haul clause" (Section
4) was under review. It was urged that even though competition by independent carriers justified under that section the rate for the longer haul to
Nashville, nevertheless this rate operated as an illegal discrimination against
Chattanooga under Section 3. To this argument Mr. Justice White responded,
at page 18 of the opinion (which, incidentally, is a chef d'oeuvre of the
White manner): "In a supposed case when, in the first instance, upon an
issue as to a violation of the fourth section of the act, it is conceded or
established that the rates charged to the shorter distance point are just
and reasonable in and of themselves, and it is also shown that the lesser
rate charged for the longer haul is not wholly unremunerative and has been
forced upon the carriers by competition at the longer distance point, it must
result that a discrimination springing alone from a disparity in rates cannot be held, in legal effect, to be the voluntary act of the defendant carriers,
and as a consequence the provisions of the third section of the act forbidding
the making or giving of an undue or unreasonable preference or advantage
will not apply. The prohibition of the third section, when that section is
considered in its proper relation, is directed against unjust discrimination or
undue preference arsing from the voluntary and wrongful act of the carriers
complained of as having given undue preference, and does not relate to acts
the result of conditions wholly beyond the control of such carriers."
The Supreme Court, relying on English authority, had first decided that
competition even by carriers not subject to the Act, was a factor which the
Commission might consider in determining whether a rate was prejudicial.
Texas & P. Ry. v. I. C. C., 162 U. S. 197 (1896). The view was reiterated
in I. C. C. v. Ala. Midland Ry., 168 U. S. 144 (1897), but the Court still
deemed the effect of competition a question of fact for the Commission.
In the East Tennessee case above, Mr. Justice White elevated the question
of fact into a rule of law.
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a defendant's act be a cause sine qua non of an injury. -Where
the acts of two independent wrongdoers concur to effect a result
which either of their acts would have sufficed to produce, either
or both may be held liable.' Yet when one of the concurrent
causes is the act of an innocent person or is a natural force, it has
been suggested that this rule will not be applied.' As far as the
fact of causal relationship is concerned, it seems obvious that no
difference springs from the guilt or innocence of the actor, but it
is equally apparent that in such cases the courts are not concerned with the logical niceties of causation but rather with the
redistribution of tort losses and the exaction of criminal penalties
for anti-social conduct.'
The distinction suggested may be seized
upon or ignored by a court, depending upon whether it wishes to
narrow or enlarge the scope.of responsibility for the harm complained of. Moreover, in the case of Commission action, it is not
enough that legal responsibility be fixed upon a defendant. The
Commission's work is essentially pragmatic, and its orders must
find their raison d' 0tre in the termination of a continuing business injury.
To the extent then that the doctrine of the Ashland case merely marks the limits of effective Commission action, it becomes
pertinent to inquire whether the enlarged powers of the Commission have thereby extended the scope of Section 3. We have already seen that the rule that a carrier must have control over both
preferential and prejudicial rates, (an outgrowth, incidentally,
of the Asdand formula, if not decision) did not survive the extension of the Commission's rate-fixing power." But here an adjustment of the rates of the participating lines will not cure the
discrimination attacked unless the Commission can also secure
jurisdiction over the independent road. Were the Commission to
order any decrease in the prejudicial rate, the competitor might
nullify it by a corresponding reduction of its preferential rate.
7Corey v. Havener, 182 Mass. 250, 65 N. E. 69 (1902); Anderson v. M.
St. P. Ry., 146 Minn. 430, 179 N. W. 45 (1920). See Smith, Legal Cause in
Actions of Tort (1912) 25 HEAv. L. REv. 303, 312; Beale, Proximate Consequences of an Act (1920) 33 H1Av. L. REv. 633, 639; McLaughlin, ProxiTnate Cause (1925) 39 HAnV. L. REv. 149, 153. When two independent acts
concur to effect a result which neither alone would have sufficed to produce,
the question whether each actor may be held responsible for the entire damage
involves somewhat different considerations, and authority is divided. See
(1920) 29 YALE L. J. 935.
09See Edgerton, Legal Cause (1924) 72 U. op PA. L. REv. 343, 346.
03Cf. GSEEN, RATIONALE OF PROMhSATE CAUSE (1927) 147; Edgerton, op.
cit. supra n. 68, at 347.

rI See p. 406, supra.
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Obviously an increase in the preferential rate by the defendant
carrier would not be effective. Only if the Commission by a
minimum rate order could prevent a reduction or compel an increase in the rate charged by the independent line would its order
be more than a gesture.
Such a minimum rate order is precisely what Commissioner
Eastman suggested in his special concurrence in the 1927 Lake
Cargo Case in which the majority were content to rest their reduction of the northern rates on Section 1. After adverting to the
contention that the C. & 0. formed, with the Hocking Valley, an
independent competitor of the other roads for the southern lake
cargo traffic, he nevertheless insisted that if "reductions in the
rates over these competitive routes were proposed corresponding
to the reductions which are required from the complaining districts, the power to suspend and pass upon such reductions brings
the situation within our control . .. Here we would be dealing
with what is practically one route out of many, and the rates
would be governed by an order under Section 3. Under such conditions resort t6 the minimum rate power can readily be justified."' Again in the 1928 decision countermanding the rate reductions made by the southern carriers to restore differentials
widened by the previous decision, Commissioner Eastman refused
to agree that this action was proper as an exercise of the minimum
rate power under Section 1. He argued that this same power
might, however, be invoked as an adjunct to the Commission's
powers under Section 3. "I rest this conclusion", he added,
"squarely upon the language of the Supreme Court in United
States v. Illinois Central R. R. "m
Although counsel for complainants do not adopt Conmissioner
Eastman's rationale, they do urge that the Illinois Central case
put an end to the doctrine of the Ashland case."' Counsel for defendants are at pains to distinguish it. The case merits examination in detail. Knoxo, situated on the Feruwood & Gulf R. R.
complained of discrimination against it by the Illinois Central R.
R. which excluded Knoxo from a surrounding blanket rate terri1 Lake Cargo Coal Rates, 1925, 126 I. C. C. at 370-373. It should be noted

that Commissioner Eastman's argument does not, apparently, eliminate the
requirement of participation in the discrimination by the same carriers. It

is only when such discrimination has been found that he would invoke tl~o

minimum rate power against independent lines whose competition would
nullify the Commission's order.
otherwise
2
7 Lake Cargo Coal, 139 I. C. C. at 403.

73Supra, n. 29.
1'Brief for Complainant, Docket No. 23240, p. 128; Brief for Complainant,

Docket No. 23241, p. 124.
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tory which included points not only on its own lines but also on
connecting short lines. The joint rate paid by Knoxo for shipment over the Fernwood & Gulf and Illinois Central was higher
than the blanket rate accorded three points alleged in the complaint to be unjustly preferred thereby. Alternative routes did
exist from points in the blanket territory. If these were independent routes which might have persisted in maintaining the discrimination despite the order directed to the Fernwood & Gulf
and the Illinois Central, then in disregarding the existence of such
routes, the Commission and the Supreme Court, which sustained
the former's order, would seem to have departed from the doctrine
of the Ashland case. But counsel for defendants refer to the
records before the Commission in seeking to establish two contentions: first, that these alternative routes were not independent
routes since rates from the Fernwood & Gulf were in effect over
them, and, second, that there were in fact no alternative routes
whatsoever from the three points alleged to have been preferred to
the prejudice of Knoxo and to which the complaint and the Commission's order were exclusively confined.'
Apparently the question of the independence of the competing
carriers was not urged before the Supreme Court. The existence
of competition was, nevertheless, relied on to justify the
preferential rates. Mr. Justice Brandeis expressly denied that
this competition, as a matter of law, established the "innocent
character of the discrimination practiced by the Illinois Central"'
although competition was a factor to be considered by the Commission in determining whether the discrimination was just. "The
newly conferred power to grant relief against rates unreasonably
low may", he continued, "afford protection against injurious
rate policies of a competitor, which were tb eretofore unconBy restricting this language to the confines of the
trollable. '
fast situation which prompted it, counsel for defendants can, of
course, distinguish the lake cargo situation. Thus, suppose that
that proceeding were directed only against the N. & W. and the
Pennsylvania with which, let us assume, it joins in granting
allegedly preferential rates. The fact that those rates were granted
to compete with the rates established over the through route of
the L. & N. and the N. Y. Central could not as a matter of law
justify the discrimination against the northern fields since the L.
7 Brief for Defendants, Docket Nos. 23240, 23241, Vol. I, p. 106.
ToUnited States .v. Illinois Central R. R., 263 U. S. at 525.
77 .Ibi.
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& N. and the N. Y. Central were themselves party to a similar
discrimination and their rates could consequently be controlled
by the Commission. It is the competition of an allegedly independent carrier not, for that reason, itself subject to Commission
discipline upon which the defendants rely to exonerate them from
responsibility. Competition that is lawful, they argue, may lawfully be met. But to Commissioner Eastman who has found in
the necessities of the situation as he conceives them the justification for an exercise of the minimum rate power giving control
over the independent carrier, this distinction would doubtless be
without persuasive significance. The competition of the independent furnishes an excuse, he argues, only when it cannot be
controlled.
What support has Commissioner Eastman's view in the decisions subsequent to the Illinois Central case from which it derives its inspiration? Counsel for both parties seize upon the
latest case in the Galveston-New Orleans litigation. For several
years, in proceedings before the Commission under Section 3,
Galveston has sought to bring an end to the equalization of rates
between Galveston and New Orleans and certain Oklahoma points.
Because of the greater distance from New Orleans to those points,
the complaining Galveston shippers alleged that this equality operated to prefer New Orleans. In 1925, the Galveston interests
were successful 8 but on a further hearing in 1927 the Commission
excepted from its order rates from points on the Texas & Pacific
R. R. and Louisiana Ry. & Nay. Co. whose lines did not reach the
Texas ports or control the rates thereto." In 1929, the exception
having been challenged, the Commission reversed itself, expressly
repudiating the doctrine which it attributed to the Ashland case
that a defendant carrier in a Section 3 proceeding must control
both the preferential and the prejudicial rates.' The defendants
in the principal case contend, however, that since New Orleans
78Galveston Comm. Assn. v. Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry., 100 I. 0. C. 110

(1925).
71Galveston Comm. Assn. v. Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry., 128 I. C. C. 349
(1927).
Galveston Comm. Assn. v. Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry., 160 I. C. C. 345
(1929), injunction denied, sub nom. Texas & Pac. Ry. v. United States, 42
F. (2d) 281 (S. D. Tex. 1930). The Court briefly dismissed the contention
of the carriers that they were not liable for undue prejudice because their
rails did, not reach the Texas ports on the authority of the eases cited in
note 29, supra. Foster, J., dissented on the ground that the Commission had
attempted to equalize port advantages and that unjust discrimination could
not arise where the carriers charged the competing ports equal rates. Cf.
Anchor Coal Co. v. United States, supra n. 3, at 471.
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carriers participated themselves in the preferential rates and since
there were no independent roads operating from those points on
their lines whose rates were in question, the Commission's decision
and that of the statutory court affirming it cannot be said to alter
the doctrine of the Ashland case in so far as it concerns the effect
of independent, competing routes.'
The Commission itself, in cases decided since the Galveston
case, seems to have been guilty of taking inconsistent positions
with respect to this narrower aspect of the doctrine. In at least
two cases involving rate discrimination the doctrine has been applied,' and in one of these the Ashland case was cited.' Yet in a
still later case, Inland Empire Mfrs. Assn. v. A. & S. Ry.,& in
which a refusal by the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul to accord
transit on lumber at Spokane was held unduly prejudicial to
western shippers when it accorded the privilege at midwestern
points, it was shown that it accorded this service to the latter only
because of the competition of independent lines. The Commission, nevertheless, found the refusal unduly prejudicial. It did
so on the authority of a case, Duluth Chamber of Commerce v.
Chicago N. W. Ry., decided in 1929 shortly before the Galveston
case, in which the Commission had refused to apply the Ashland
doctrine to a discrimination arising out of the granting of concentration arrangements on a route subject to independent competition and the refusal to accord such arrangements on a non-competitive route. The majority in neither case vouchsafed reasons
for this departure. It evoked vigorous protests in the earlier case
from three Commissioner,' and Commissioner Eastman, concurring
specially, conceded that the dissenters made "a strong technical
ease" and rested his concurrence on the assumption that the competition in fact was not sufficiently strong to compel the
preferential practice.' In the later case, two Commissioners concurred separately, echoing wistfully the sentiments previously expressed in dissent.'
If one were to attempt the task which the majority were content to eschew and venture a reconciliation of this apparent incon"Brief for Defendants, Docket Nos. 23240, 23241, Vol. I, p. 86.
-Wisconsin Bridge & Iron Co. v. Illinois Terminal Co., 161 I. 0. C. 176
(1930); Eastern Class Rate Investigation, 164 I. C. C. 314, 416 (1930).
c Wisconsin Bridge & Iron Co. v. Illinois Terminal Co., supra n.82, at 179.
165 I. C. C. 53 (1930).
-156 I. C.C. 156 (1929).
Ibid. at 170, 171.
t
Ibid. at 169.
1 Inland Empire Mfrs. Assn. v. A. & S. Ry., Tupra n. 84, at 63.
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sistency, it might be found in the nature of the discrimination. If
the defendant carrier were to grant the complaining shippers the
transit service they sought, the discrimination would be terminated
once and for all, for services of this nature are not susceptible of
indefinite extension and consequently the independent competitor
would not be likely to revive the discrimination by a further
preference. Rates, however, may always be lowered so that the
reduction of a preferential rate carries with it no guaranty of
continued equilibrium if there is competition on the prejudicial
route. Certainly, whatever explanation for the present course of
the Commission's decisions may eventually prove to be valid,
one cannot consider the question foreclosed. The ultimate fate
of the Ashland doctrine must wait upon the action of the Supreme
Court.
This detailed analysis of the significance of the independent
carrier has, of course, been premised on the assumption that the
C. & 0. route to Toledo over its Hocking Valley lines would meet
the requirement of independence.'
The question raised by its
service to the complaining Hocking and Crooksville fields has already been mentioned.'
Three others must be decided. First
comes a question purely of fact. Could the Toledo route haul
the entire southern lake cargo coal traffic if the other southern
carriers were to withdraw from their concurrences with those
northern roads which also serve the southern field? On this issue,
testimony is sharply in conflict. The examiner does not seek to
resolve the difference. Assume, for the purpose of the next questions, that the Commission finds it impracticable for the C. &
The existence of independent carriers serving only the northern fields has
been mentioned. See p. 399, supra. Considerable evidence has been offered
by defendants to show that the participating northern carriers " originated" a
relatively small proportion of the lake cargo coal from the Pennsylvania
districts although the B. & 0. and Pennsylvania "originated" a major portion of the Ohio production. The purpose of this testimony was to prove
that these participating carriers were not the "rate-making lines" from the
complaining districts. Brief for Defendants, Docket Nos. 23240, 23241, Vol.
II, 104-119.
Unless this evidence can sustain an allegation that their
participation was not material in the sense suggested by Commissioner Eastman in the Baltimore Chamber of Commerce case, supra n. 59, it is difficult
to appreciate its value in the light of the Galveston case, supra n. 80. Moreover, does the existence of competition with independent lines serving the
prejudicial districts provide any basis for an application of the doctrine of
the Ashland case? Would not the effect of this competition be nullified by
the lowering of the prejudicial rate? Yet the Commission has referred heretofore to the existence of these lines in this connection without disclosing
precisely how it considered them significant. See Lake Cargo Coal Rates,
1925, 101 I. C. C. at 545; Lake Cargo Coal Rates, 1925, 126 I. 0. 0. at 385.
00See p. 408, supra.
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0. to haul aU the southern coal. Does the fact that it joins with
roads participating in the preferential rate in establishing its own
competing rate render it also a participant in the illegal discrimination? This seems to carry the doctrine of participation a
step further than the cases have yet done. The Commission has
always considered the Toledo route free from Section 3 orders
even though the C. & 0. has joined therein with carriers which
in turn participated in joint rates with the northern carriers.
If it would not itself be subject as a guilty participant to the Commission's control, then it would seem to meet the requirement of
independence. This opens the way for the final question: Assuming its independence in the sense that it would not be subject itself to a Commission order, would its inability to haul all the
traffic from the preferred point deprive its competitors, the
participating defendants, of the protection of the Ashland doctrine? Probably in the lake cargo coal traffic alone could this
question arise. Few commodities tax so severely the carrying
powers of the carriers. However, the same principle would be
involved were the question whether the independent line would
in fact be able to draw away the traffic from the defendant by
reason of its being able to maintain the preferential rate or
practice. In the Duluth case discussed above,' it will be recalled
that that consideration was raised in Commissioner Eastman's
special concurrence. The fact basis for the answer to either question must of necessity be more or less speculative. In view of
that uncertainty perhaps the capacity of the independent carrier
to attract and handle a very large proportion of the preferred
traffic will answer the requirement of the Asdand doctrine. But
here once more is a question for which resort to the cases will not
provide an answer.
VI
The path of this inquiry into the limitations which the
Supreme Court or the Commission itself may impose upon the
.P In Lake Cargo Coal Rates, 1925, 126 I. C. C. at 364, the following statement was made with reference to the Hocking Valley Ry., now a part of the
C. & O.'s Toledo route: "The fact the latter [H. V. Ry.] joins with certain
of the lines serving the complaining districts in joint rates from some of the
preferred districts does not make it responsible for the rates maintained by
the other lines from the complaining districts, but even if it did, the Hocking
Valley's withdrawal from the joint rates referred to would not effect the
same rates maintained by it in connection with the Chesapeake & Ohio or
See also Lake Cargo Coal Rates, 1925, 126 I. C. C. at
Iorfolk & Western."
364, Lake Cargo Coal, 139 I. C. C. at 403.
See p. 415, supra.
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application of Section 3 of the Interstate Commerce Act has been
a tortuous one. A recapitulation is indicated. The questions
which may be raised in the current or some future attempt to
apply that provision to the lake cargo coal rate regulation comprise, in summary, the following:
(1) -Must the Commission find participation by the same
carrier or carriers in either the preferential or the prejudicial
rates?
(2) If participation be required, is this requirement satisfied by any participation, however slight, or must it be "material",
either in the sense of a substantial participation or one sufficient
to insure the participant a voice in the rate-making ?
(3) Is the granting of a preferential rate a ground for
liability on the part of the participants thereto when a competing
carrier not so participating is in a position, if permitted, to maintain the preference at the same or a lower rate, or does the competing carrier thereby become subject itself to the minimum rate
power of the Commission?
(4) If the competition of a non-participating carrier be an
excuse for the continuance of a preferential rate by a participating
carrier, must it be shown that the competing carrier can and will
move all the traffic from the preferred point if the participant
should withdraw its preferential rate?
The examiner, in the pending case, evaded these thorny issues
by finding that the lake cargo coal rate differentials now in effect were not, as a matter of "fact", unduly prejudicial.' Suppose the Commission itself comes to an opposite conclusion. Assume, further, that, confronted as it would then be by these legal
questions, the Commission resolved them in favor of its own
jurisdiction. On appeal counsel for defendants would, of course,
assign this decision as error, but an attack on the finding of fact
itself would call for the successful manipulation of that process,
already described," whereby errors of law are revealed to have
taken place in the determination of what is uniformly recognized
as a question of fact.
An opportunity for the application of this process in the
present case may be latent in the question whether evidence as to
conditions in the coal industry in the northern and southern fields
may properly be admitted or considered by the Commission. The
uninformed might suppose that the grant of power to determine
P3

U. S. Daily, May 9, 1931, at 588.
See p. 395, supra.
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a question of fact would carry with it the power to decide what
evidence is relevant to the determination of that question, but that
separation of function between judge and jury which is fundamental in our trial procedure has been carried over into administrative law.' It affords a convenient lever with which to dislodge
an adverse Commission finding.
In earlier lake cargo coal cases evidence of industrial conditions had been considered by the Commission in determining
whether the rates from the competing fields were reasonable.'
Indeed, this consideration was one of the grounds on which an
injunction was granted following the review of the statutory
court of the Commission's decision in favor of complainants in
1928.' In these Section 1 proceedings, evidence disclosing greater
industrial handicaps born by the northern operators was doubtless
of persuasive influence in their favor. But now that Section 3 is
invoked, the southern interests are the parties who support its
relevance. Their theory is this: discriminatory rates may not be
disturbed unless injury is shown to have resulted therefrom. Complainants have introduced evidence showing a diminution in the
volume and proportion of tonnage moving from their fields to
prove that the present and past differentials have worked them
injury. It is therefore permissible for defendants to submit
evidence tending to show that this shift in traffic was due not to
0 See note 17, supra.

The most receptive attitude toward evidence of this nature was displayed
in Boileu v. P. & L. E. R. R., 22 I. 0. 0. at 647, where Commissioner Meyer
said: "We interpret his [counsel for defendants] argument to mean that all
conditions of every kind whatsoever surrounding this coal industry, which
may be directly or indirectly affected by the rates, such as the profits of
the operators and carriers, the wages and standard of living of the miners
and railway employees, may be rightfully considered. Whatever legal limitations may be imposed upon this view by the act to regulate commerce as at
present interpreted, from the point of view of public policy and humanity,
considerations like those adverted to by counsel most assuredly should not be
ignored."
17Anchor Coal Co. v. United States, supra n.3, at 470. In Lake Cargo Coal
Rates, 1925, 126 I. C. C. at 362, the Commission sought to justify its consideration of industrial conditions in reliance upon the Hoch-Smith Resolution, 43 STAT. 801 (1925), 49 U. S. C. A. § 55 (1926), which directed the
Commission to investigate and revise the freight rate structure, with "due
regard to the general and comparative levels in market value of the various
classes and kinds of commodities .... to a natural and proper development

of the country as a whole, and to the maintenance of an adequate system
of transportation." For a discussion of the Resolution and the recent decisioli of the Supreme Court construing it, Ann Arbor R. R. v. United States,
281 U. S.658 (1930), see Mansfield, op. cit. supra n. 20. In its 1928 decision, Lake Cargo Coal, 139 I. C. C. at 373, the Commission disclaimed any
concern in evidence as to industrial conditions except in so far as it might
explain tile shift in the lake cargo traffic.
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transportation charges but to industrial conditions militating
against the northern operators over which the carriers had no
control.'
To this contention, complainants' counsel would no
doubt respond that if, from a study of transportation conditions,
it were shown that the rate structure did not adequately reflect
the services rendered the respective parties, then inevitably this
discrimination must have augmented whatever loss was suffered
by complainants by reason of their industrial handicaps. Consequently an inquiry into the nature and extent of those handicaps
would be superfluous and irrelevant.
A court so inclined might dispose of complainants' objection
by declaring it to go to the weight and not to the relevance of
the evidence in dispute. The weight to be accorded relevant
evidence is within the discretion of the Commission, and is held
not to present a question of law.' It is difficult to suppress the
suspicion that whether this question is to be held one of fact or
of law depends ultimately on whether the reviewing court is or
is not in agreement with the result reached by the Commission.
'This power of materializing questions of law out of the determination of questions of fact for the purpose of controlling administrative action is too valuable a weapon for the courts to blunt its
edge by unnecessary use.'
At the threshold of this essay in legal question-finding, recognition was accorded the force exerted by the nonlegalistic factors
operative in this field of law, and the impossibility of appraising
their relative weight was duly confessed. The known existence of
these unknown factors would vitiate any attempt at prediction
which, but for its debatable propriety in the present circumstances
might here be hazarded. When one bent on prophecy consults the
omens and auspices of these Court and Commission decisions, he is
The recent gain in the northern field's share of the lake cargo traffic
is also explained on the ground that industrial conditions in the respective
fields axe now more nearly equalized. Brief for Intervening W. Va., Tenn.,
Xy. and Va. Coal Operators, Docket Nos. 23240, 23241, pp. 157-176.
Illinois Central R. R. v. I. C. C., 206 U. S. 441 (1907).
1 Another potential question of law is one suggested by the Anchor Coal
Co. case. There Judge Parker argued that there could be no injury arising
from an alleged discrimination in rates where the preferential rate was in
fact higher than the prejudicial one. Anchor Coal Co. v. United States, 25
F. (2d) at 471. This view disregards, of course, the difference in treatment
arising out of the exaction of a higher rate per unit of service from one
shipper than from another.
A contrary position has been taken by
the Conmissiox in its construction of the Act. Elk Cement & Lime Co. v.
B. & 0. R. R., 22 1. C. C. 84 (1911).
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impressed with the difficulty of applying to them the technique
which is employed with varying success in the domain of private
law; and this is not because the Commission decisions are subjected
to the condescension of "administrative interpretations' '"n nor
because the problems of law are either new or recondite. The
explanation lies in the fact that the underlying considerations of
economic policy may at times be found by those vested with the
power of decision to be so overwhelming as to break down the
trammels of analogy and to dwarf into relative insignificance the
language of previous opinions. Stare decisis is here revealed as
an instrumentality of rather than a limitation upon the judicial
process. The technique of the lawyer remains of value in the
formulation of the issues, but it is the economist, the political
scientist, the statesman who, clothed with the judicial power,
renders the decision.
MaFor the rules evolved by the Supreme Court in its reference to administra-

live construction a§ a guide in the interpretation of statutes, see Note (1927)

40 HARv. L. REv. 469. Just how effective a long-sustained course of administrative action is as a deterrent upon a court inclined to reach'a contrary
result is but another legal immeasurable. Certainly the rules themselves allow

the court ample freedom.
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